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THE NBA AND THE GREAT RECESSION:





Like most businesses, the National Basketball Association (NBA)
has suffered significant negative impacts from the Great Recession.
The league's drop in revenue exposed distinct flaws in the NBA's cur-
rent business model and in the terms of employment for NBA players.
Due to the precarious economic state of the NBA, the league antici-
pates a contentious, but necessary, renegotiation of the NBA's collec-
tive bargaining agreement (CBA), which will expire at the end of the
2010-11 season. This article will analyze the effects of the Great Re-
cession on the NBA and the likely implications for the renegotiation
of the CBA. Part II of this article will provide a macro-level overview
of the economic impacts experienced by the NBA during the current
economic meltdown. Part III will explore the attendant effects on
NBA players. Part IV will then give an overview of the collective bar-
gaining process-including its significance in sports, antitrust, and la-
bor and employment law-and explore the employment terms that
will likely become the focus of the upcoming CBA renegotiation. Fi-
nally, Part V will provide some concluding insights.
II. EcoNoMIc IMPACTS OF THE GREAT RECESSION ON
THE NBA AND ITS TEAMS
The Great Recession has clearly affected the financial stability of
the NBA. 1 NBA Commissioner David Stern recently projected that
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1. The etymology of the term "Great Recession" is an interesting one. See Catherine
Rampell, "Great Recession": A Brief Etymology, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/. However, for pur-
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the NBA would lose approximately $400 million for the 2009-10 sea-
son.2 This figure doubles the amount of money-$200 million-that
the NBA has lost in each of the past four seasons.3 The National Bas-
ketball Players Association (NBPA)-the union that represents pro-
fessional basketball players in the NBA-originally expressed doubts
about the veracity of this loss projection.4 However, NBPA President
Derek Fisher later backtracked on this position by acknowledging that
the NBA might lose this amount of money, but questioned whether it
was fair to place the blame on what some perceived to be excessive
player salaries.5 Fisher suggested that the current bad economic con-
ditions and the circumstances or actions of some teams-including
having outdated arenas or hurting attendance by "dumping" players
in order to create salary cap room for the next season-may be caus-
ing the revenue loss, not necessarily player salaries.6 As will be dis-
cussed further below, the solutions to such revenue loss will likely
constitute some of the more contentious terms in the renegotiation of
the NBA CBA. The various manifestations of the economic downturn
provide an important context for understanding the flaws in the
NBA's current structure and what may be required to bring financial
stability to the league.
A. Drop in Revenue and Salary Cap Implications
Nearly half of NBA teams posted losses for the 2008-09 season.7
This included the NBA Eastern Conference Champion Orlando
Magic, which lost between $15 million and $20 million for the 2008-09
poses of this article, the term "Great Recession" will be used to refer to the economic downturn
that befell the United States economy-and the world economy more generally-beginning in
2007.
2. See Ian Thomsen, Stern Projects $400 Million in Losses, SI.com, Feb. 13, 2010, http://sport-
sillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/ianthomsen/02/13/stern.all.star/index.html.
3. See Henry Abbott, Stern Proposition, ESPN.com, Feb. 13. 2010, http://espn.go.com/blog/
truehoop/post/_/id/13183/stern-proposition.
4. See Union Doubts Stern's Claim of$400 Million in Losses for League, SPORTINGNEWS.COM,
Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.sportingnews.com/bloglTheBaseline/entry/view/60053/uniondoubts-
sternsclaimof_$400_million-inlosses-forleague.
5. See Chris Tomasson, Union President Fisher: Premature to Say NBA Salaries Too High,
FANHOUSE.COM, Mar. 1, 2010, http://nba.fanhouse.com/2010/03/01/union-president-fisher-pre-
mature-to-say-nba-salaries-too-high/. In addition to being the NBPA President, Fisher is a guard
for the Los Angeles Lakers.
6. Id.
7. George M. Thomas, Recession Puts Dents in Contract Extensions: LeBron, Bosh and Wade
Facing Hard Decisions That They May Delay, THE AKRON BEACON J., July 18, 2009, at SPORTS,
http://www.ohio.com/sports/cavs/51078942.html. Operating losses are generally calculated in
terms of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. See Kurt Badenhausen,
Michael K. Ozanian, & Christina Settimi, The Business of Basketball, FORBES.COM, Dec. 9, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/09/nba-basketball-valuations-business-sports-basketball-values-
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season, and the lowly Sacramento Kings, which lost nearly $25 mil-
lion.8 A portion of these revenue losses can be attributed to the de-
cline in gate receipts for the season. While the regular season gate
receipts for the league as a whole were only down 0.2% from the
2007-08 season-$2.66 million less than the $1.1 billion in gate reve-
nue generated during the previous season-this figure is somewhat
misleading due to a dramatic increase in gate receipts for one particu-
lar team: the Seattle SuperSonics.9 During the 2007-08 season, the
Seattle SuperSonics suffered its worst losing season in its forty-one
year history.' 0 The team's poor performance, coupled with the antici-
pated relocation of the team from Seattle to Oklahoma City at the
end of the season,' led to the team's lowest average attendance in
seventeen years and the third lowest attendance in the NBA that sea-
son.12 Once the team moved to Oklahoma City, a city hungry for a
professional sports team of its own, the team increased attendance by
more than 5,000 fans per game and by more than 200,000 fans for the
season.' 3 In doing so, the Oklahoma City Thunder improved to the
eleventh best attendance in the NBA for the 2008-09 season and en-
joyed improved gate receipts of $27.2 million-a 145% increase from
09-intro.html (noting that twelve of the NBA's thirty teams posted operating losses for the 2008-
09 season).
8. Barry Jackson, Although Star Players are Still Getting Big Contracts, the Reeling Economy is
Affecting the Major U.S. Pro Leagues in Different Ways, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 8, 2009, at D1O
(noting that Orlando Magic CEO Alex Martins stated that the team would likely lose between
$15 million and $20 million for the 2008-09 season) and Ailene Voisin, Change is in the Air:
Arena Issue Looms Large as Losses Mount, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 10, 2009, at C1 (stating that
the team could lose up to $25 million for the 2008-09 season).
9. Ken Berger, Head Straight to Gate for Sign of Weakness in NBA Money Machine, CBSS-
PORTS.COM, July 8, 2009, http://www.cbssports.com/nba/story/11934840.
10. See Matt Levin, Tulsans Ready for NBA, TULSA WORLD, July 11, 2008, at BI.
11. See Jim Brunner, Bennett Files to Move Sonics to Oklahoma City, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 2,
2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003990107_sonicsmove03m.html.
12. See Supersonics Attendance, BASKETBALLREFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketballrefer-
ence.com/teams/teamatt.htm?tm=Sea&lg=n (detailing the average attendance of 13,355 for the
2007-08 season and for all previous seasons) and 2007-08 Seattle Supersonics Roster and Statistics,
BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference.com/teams/SEA/2008.html
(noting that the SuperSonics ranked 28th out of 30 in the NBA in attendance for the 2007-08
season with 547,556 fans attending games).
13. See Oklahoma City Thunder Attendance, DATABASEBASKETBALL.COM, http://www.data
basebasketball.com/teams/teamatt.htm?tm=OKC&lg=n (noting the average attendance of
18,693 per game during the 2008-09 season-more than 5,000 fans on average more than the
13,355 per game during the 2007-08 season) and Supersonics Attendance, supra note_ (detailing
the average attendance for the Seattle SuperSonics' previous forty-one seasons). Due to Hurri-
cane Katrina, the New Orleans Hornets played much of their 2005-06 and 2006-07 seasons in
Oklahoma City, but the move was always meant to be temporary. See Michael A. McCann,
Social Psychology, Calamities, and Sports Law, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 585, 590 (2006).
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the team's final season in Seattle.14 Many experts believe that the
team will not be able to sustain such attendance and gate receipts and
that both will decline in time.i5 In this regard, the Oklahoma City
Thunder attendance during their inaugural season was likely an anom-
aly that falsely propped up the NBA's overall gate revenues for 2008-
09.
The reality was that many teams experienced significant reductions
in gate revenue for the 2008-09 season. For example, when compared
to the 2007-08 season, the following teams saw reductions of more
than $5 million in their gate receipts: New Jersey Nets, $11.4 million;
Sacramento Kings, $9.7 million; Toronto Raptors, $9.1 million, Detroit
Pistons, $7.7 million; Los Angeles Clippers, $6.8 million; and Miami
Heat, $5.3 million.16 In addition, the Charlotte Bobcats, Indiana Pac-
ers, and Washington Wizards experienced a reduction in gate receipts
in excess of $4 million.' 7 Five NBA teams also generated less than
$500,000 in gate receipts per home game for the 2008-09 season: At-
lanta Hawks, Indiana Pacers, Memphis Grizzlies, Milwaukee Bucks,
and Minnesota Timberwolves.' 8 The reduction in gate receipts is par-
ticularly problematic for NBA teams because ticket revenue usually
constitutes up to fifty percent of a team's yearly budget.19
The 2009-10 season looks equally grim, if not worse, for the league
and its teams. Through the first month of the 2009-10 season, the av-
erage paid attendance in the league was down almost four percent
from the year before.20 Moreover, eighty to ninety percent of NBA
teams are expected to lose money for the 2009-10 season. 2 1 Some
teams face potentially staggering losses. For example, the Charlotte
14. 2008-09 Oklahoma City Thunder Roster and Statistics, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM,
http://www.basketball-reference.com/teams/OKC/2009.htmi (noting that the team's season at-
tendance of 766,868 ranked 11th out of 30 in the NBA for the 2008-09 season) and Berger, supra
note - (detailing the dramatic increase in attendance and gate receipts between the team's
2007-08 and 2008-09 seasons).




19. See John Lombardo & Tripp Mickle, NBA, NHL Budgets Stressed by Flat Ticket Revenue
Outlook, SPORTSBUSINESSJOURNAL.COM, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/
article/61683.
20. See Ken Berger, NBA Ticket Revenue Slides 7.4 Percent, CBSSPORTs.coM, Dec. 11, 2009,
http://ken-berger.blogs.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/11838893/18850386.
21. See Chris Tomasson, Stern Doesn't Expect Contentious All-Star Labor Negotiations,
FANHOUSECOM, Feb. 12, 2010, http://nba.fanhouse.com/2010/02/12/stern-doesnt-expect-conten-
tious-all-star-labor-negotiations/ (noting that twenty-five to twenty-seven of the NBA's thirty
teams were expected to lose money for the 2009-10 season).
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Bobcats expect to lose upwards of $30 million for the season.22 The
Minnesota Timberwolves anticipate losing $25 million.23 While final
figures will not be available until after the season ends, it is unsurpris-
ing that Commissioner Stern has bemoaned the financial state of the
NBA and its teams as of late.
While a significant portion of teams' losses can be attributed to the
reduction in gate receipts, most teams have lost revenue-or face the
future loss of revenue-in other important business areas. For exam-
ple, while the NBA claims that its games in the 2008-09 boasted more
than ninety percent capacity, this figure is somewhat deceiving as it
includes tickets that teams gave away without charging for them-it
includes "comp tickets" that teams gave away-and tickets that were
paid for, but the ticketholder did not attend the game. 24 In fact, the
average attendance at NBA games during the 2008-09 season was
14,072-approximately seventy-three percent of arena capacity in the
NBA. 2 5 Moreover, some teams struggled mightily with their actual
attendance numbers: the Indiana Pacers, Milwaukee Bucks, and Sac-
ramento Kings drew less than 11,000 per game; the Charlotte Bobcats
and the Minnesota Timberwolves had average attendances below
10,000; and the Memphis Grizzlies had an average of 7,570 fans per
game.26 Such lackluster attendance also hurts teams' revenues, as
teams depend on fans-even those with comp tickets-to pay for
parking, souvenirs, and food and drink. 27
Decreased corporate support has also hurt the NBA and its teams.
For example, the NBA lost long-time corporate partners McDonald's
and Toyota when both chose not to renew their sponsorship deals with
the league.28 The league did, however, extend its seventeen-year
sponsorship deal with Nike and added Taco Bell as a new corporate
22. See NBA Board Approves Bobcats' Sale to Jordan, NBA.com, Mar. 17, 2010, http://
www.nba.com/2010/news/03/17/jordan.sale.ap/index.html.
23. See Ken Helin, Timberwolves Set to Lose $25 Million, NBCSPORTS.COM, Feb. 26, 2010,
http://probasketbalitalk.nbcsports.com/2010/02/timberwolves-set-to-lose-25-million.php.
24. See Berger, supra note 9 (describing the NBA's claim that its arenas were at 90.4% capac-
ity for the 2008-09 season). In fact, some teams, such as the Atlanta Hawks, Minnesota





28. See Rick Harrow & Karla Swatek, The Tip-Off on the NBA's New Season: Expensive Ac-
quisitions, A Last-Minute Referee Contract, and New Marketing Schemes Greet the 2009-2010
Basketball Season, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/
nov2009/bw2009112_918819.htm. McDonald's had been an NBA corporate sponsor for nineteen
years when it ended the relationship. Id.
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sponsor.29 Local sponsorships for individual teams have proven more
challenging. Approximately forty percent of NBA teams' local spon-
sorship agreements come up for renewal annually.30 Given the diffi-
cult economic times, teams have struggled to convince corporate
sponsors to renew such agreements.31 Many teams have had to re-
duce the cost and/or length of the contract to keep local sponsors.32
Such creative sponsorship structuring has enabled many teams to
reach their revenue goals in this area. However, this experience has
suggested that the relationship of corporations and the NBA-and
other professional sports leagues-may be changing because of the
difficult economic times.
Indeed, with many businesses looking to cut expenses due to the
economic downturn, NBA teams also face new challenges selling
higher-priced seating such as premium seats and luxury suites. Before
the 2008-09 season, many teams experienced declining renewals for
premium seat sales.33 Premium seats, or "club seats," describe seating
within sports facilities that boast enhanced amenities such as wait staff
for concessions, access to exclusive clubs or lounges, better sight lines,
and a wider variety and higher quality of food and beverage options-
all for a ticket price significantly more expensive than traditional seat-
ing options.34 When originally devised, teams envisioned premium
seats as providing a significant revenue source for team owners.35
However, even before the Great Recession, NBA teams found it diffi-
cult to sell premium seats and thus converted many of them into regu-
lar season ticket seating options.36 With corporations less inclined to
29. Id.
30. See Tripp Mickle & John Ourand, Premium-Seat Renewals Could Provide Even Tougher
Challenge for NBA, NHL Franchises, SPORTSBUSINESSJOURNAL.COM, Mar 2, 2009, http://
www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/61758.
31. See Dave McMenamin, In Detroit, Pistons Try to Beat an Economic Full-Court Press,
NBA.com, Feb, 17, 2009, http://www.nba.com/2009/news/features/dave-mcmenamin/02/17/de-
troit.20090217/.
32. See id. (describing the Detroit Pistons need to split sponsorship contracts between two
different corporate sponsors because sponsors no longer wanted to pay for an entire forty-one
game season) and Mickle & Ourand, supra note 30 (describing the different types of sponsor-
ship deals that the Atlanta Hawks offered its corporate sponsors).
33. See Mickle & Ourand, supra note 30. For an analysis of luxury suite sales before the Great
Recession, see Heather J. Lawrence, James Kahler, and Ron T. Contorno, An Examination of
Luxury Suite Ownership in Professional Sports, 1 JOURNAL OF VENUE AND EVENT MANAGE-
MENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.hrsm.sc.edu/JVEM/VollNol/LuxurySuites.pdf.
34. See Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where
We Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 201 (2005) and Jack F. Williams, The Coming
Revenue Revolution in Sports, 42 WILLIAME-E L. REV. 669, 682 (2006).
35. See Mayer, III, supra note 34, at 202.
36. See Don Muret, Once-Hot Club Seats Have Fewer Fans, SPORTsBUSINESSJOURNAL.COM,
Feb. 23, 2004, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.comarticle/36932.
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pay for expensive premium seating, this problem has only grown
worse. It has become increasingly clear that premium seating cannot
be relied upon for the type of enhanced revenue stream that owners
once hoped for.
NBA teams also experienced similar difficulties with luxury suites.
Luxury suites are private rooms within sports facilities that offer ca-
tering services, access to private clubs or lounges, a comfortable envi-
ronment to enjoy the game, a private bar, and optimal views of the
game.3 7  Luxury suites quickly became a favorite of team owners
when building a new sports facility, as luxury suites were sold at a
premium price that led to a substantial revenue stream-money that
does not have to be shared under revenue sharing agreements. 38
While many NBA teams have corporations locked into longer-term
agreements for these lucrative seating options-most usually have
ten-year contracts-some of those deals are set to expire soon with
little hope of anything close to one hundred percent renewal rates.39
Moreover, many teams are experiencing luxury suites going "dark,"
where the suites go unsold or the suite holders choose not to attend to
save money on the food and drink that would have been consumed
during the game.4 0 The precarious nature of this revenue source poses
great challenges for many teams, as such monies have traditionally
constituted a significant portion of a team's revenue stream. 41
All of these revenue reductions are significant for the upcoming
CBA renegotiation because they directly affect the NBA's basketball
related income (BRI), salary cap, and luxury tax threshold. The BRI
is a term used in the NBA's CBA to encompass most revenues gener-
ated by the NBA and its member teams. 42 These monies include
37. See Sanjay Jose Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency and the New Eco-
nomics of the NFL, 7 MARO. SPORTS L.J. 1, 16 (1996).
38. See Amanda Schlager, Is the Suite Life Truly Sweet? The Property Rights Luxury Box
Owners Actually Acquire, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 453, 456 (2006).
39. See Mickle & Ourand, supra note 30 (noting that the Atlanta Hawks, Denver Nuggets,
and Toronto Raptors all have their ten-year agreements concluding at the end of the 2009-10
season) and Anthony Schoettle, Sales of Luxury Suites Slow at Most Indianapolis Venues, INDI-
ANA BUSINESS JOURNAL, Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.ibj.com/pro-teams-endure-notsosuite-time/
PARAMSlarticle/10587 (detailing the ending of the Indiana Pacers' ten-year luxury suite con-
tracts after the 2008-09 season and the difficulty renewing them).
40. See Bill Simmons, Welcome to the No Benjamins Association, ESPN.com, Feb. 27, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espni/page2/story?page=simmons/090227.
41. See Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed New Sports Facilities: Are They Economically
Justifiable? A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U. MIAMI B. L. REv. 483, 504
(2002) (detailing the importance of luxury suites as a revenue stream in new sports facility
financing).
42. See NAT'L BASKETBALL Ass'N & NAT'L BASKETBALL PLAYERS Ass'N, COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING AGREEMENT art. VII, § 1(a) (executed July 29, 2005), available at http://www.nbpa.org/
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ticket sales, television revenue, sponsorship agreements, and other in-
come derived from basketball operations.43 A reduction in BRI has a
direct impact on the league's salary cap, which equals fifty-one per-
cent of BRI.4 4 The salary cap restricts teams from having player sala-
ries that exceed this threshold unless it meets one of the enumerated
exceptions listed in the CBA-thus constituting a "soft" salary cap. 4 5
Therefore, as the BRI declines, so does the salary cap-thus poten-
tially limiting the ability of teams to sign new players or re-sign their
existing players.
For the 2009-10 season, the NBA salary cap was $57.7 million, down
from $58.68 million the season before.46 This reduction in the salary
cap marked only the second time that the salary cap decreased from
one year to the next since the NBA first instituted a salary cap in the
1983-84 season. 47 Soon after the 2009-10 season began, predictions
for the 2010-11 salary cap ranged from $50 million to $54 million. 48 In
fact, just before the 2009-10 season began, the NBA league office told
the NBA Board of Governors that the salary cap for the 2010-11 sea-
cba/2005 [hereinafter NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT] (describing BRI as the ag-
gregate operating revenues of the NBA or its member teams during a particular season).
43. Matthew Epps, Full Court Press: How Collective Bargaining Weakened the NBA's Compet-
itive Edge in a Globalized Sport, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 343-44 n.3 (2009). See also
Larry Coon's NBA Salary FAQ, http://members.cox.net/Imcoon/salarycap.htm#Q16 (last visited
April 11, 2010) (listing numerous other revenue sources that are included in the BRI calculation,
such as parking, concessions, forty percent of arena signage; forty percent of luxury suite reve-
nue; forty-five to fifty percent of arena naming rights; and revenue generated from NBA En-
tertainment, the NBA All-Star Game, and other NBA special events). The BRI for the 2008-09
season was $3.608 billion. See id.
44. See Chris Deubert & Glenn M. Wong, Understanding the Evolution of the Signing Bonuses
and Guaranteed Money in the National Football League: Preparing for the 2011 Collective Bar-
gaining Negotiations, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 179, 228-29 (2009) (noting that the NBA CBA
calculates the league's salary cap as fifty-one percent of BRI). See also NBA COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 42, at art. VII, § 12 (detailing the salary cap calculation).
45. See Ryan T. Dryer, Comment, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. Disp. RESOL. 267,
276-77 (2008). See also James L. Perzik, Mysteries of the NBA "Salary Cap" and the "Escrow and
Tax" System, SM009 ALI-ABA 149 (2007) (describing some of the enumerated exceptions to the
salary cap contained in the NBA CBA, including the veteran free agent exception, the bi-annual
exception, and the mid-level salary exception, to name but a few).
46. Press Release, National Basketball Association, NBA Salary Cap Set for the 2009-10 Sea-
son (July 7, 2009), available at http://www.nba.com/2009/news/07/07/salarycap.aplindex.htmi.
The salary cap was $49.5 million in 2005-06; $53.135 million in 2006-07; and $55.63 million in
2007-08. See Larry Coon's NBA Salary FAQ, supra note 43.
47. Marc Stein, 2010 Cap May Limit Signings, ESPN.com, July 8, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.
com/nba/news/story?id=4312837.
48. Mark J. Miller, Drastic Drop Not Expected in NBA Salary Cap, SIORTS.YAHOO.COM, Dec.
24, 2009, http://sports.yahoo.comlnba/rumors/post/Drastic-drop-not-expected-in-NBA-salary-cap
?urn=nba,210738 (discussing different salary cap projections being used by NBA teams for the
2010-11 season).
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son would likely be around $52 million. 4 9 However, the salary cap for
the 2010-11 season will be approximately $56.1 million, which consti-
tutes a smaller drop than many anticipated.50 Nevertheless, even this
figure is problematic for teams. Before the Great Recession, the an-
ticipated salary cap for the 2010-11 season was approximately $63 mil-
lion-creating the likelihood that the actual salary cap could be nearly
$7 million less than anticipated a mere two years ago when teams
started long-term strategic planning for the 2010-11 season.5 '
In an era of declining revenues, this type of limitation on spending
imposed by a salary cap may appear desirable and beneficial to the
owners. However, the salary cap is coupled with a luxury tax thresh-
old that poses a significant economic penalty for teams that exceed it.
The luxury tax threshold is determined by taking sixty-one percent of
BRI-minus projected benefits and adjusting for whether the prior
season's BRI exceeded or fell short of its projected level-and divid-
ing it by the number of teams in the league.52 Any team whose collec-
tive salaries exceed the luxury tax threshold must pay a dollar-for-
dollar penalty to the league for this differential.53 The league then
distributes this money to the teams that do not exceed the luxury
tax.5 4 For the 2008-09 season, the luxury tax threshold was $71.150
million, and the following teams exceeded that amount and had to pay
the NBA the dollar for dollar penalty: New York Knicks ($23.9 mil-
lion), Dallas Mavericks ($23.6 million), Cleveland Cavaliers ($13.7
million), Boston Celtics ($8.3 million), Los Angeles Lakers ($7.2 mil-
lion), Portland Trailblazers ($5.9 million), and the Phoenix Suns ($4.9
million).55 The luxury tax threshold for the 2009-10 season is $69.92
million and is projected to be around $68 million for the 2010-11
season.56
49. Chris Sheridan, What Will Next Summer's Salary Cap Be?, ESPN.com, Dec. 24, 2009,
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_1id/11723/what-will-next-summers-salary-cap-be. Some
agents who are familiar with the league's financial situation are projecting a salary cap more in
the range of $54 million. Id.
50. See Chris Sheridan, NBA Cap Projection Higher Than Thought, ESPN.com, April 17,
2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=5099980.
51. See Stein, supra note 47.
52. See Larry Coon's NBA Salary FAQ, supra note 43.
53. See Christine Snyder, Note, Perfect Pitch: How U.S. Sports Financing and Recruiting Mod-
els Can Restore Harmony Between FIFA and the EU, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 499, 522
(2009).
54. See Larry Coon's NBA Salary FAQ, supra note 43.
55. Id.
56. See Stein, supra note 47 (noting the 2009-10 luxury tax threshold) and Sheridan, supra
note - (noting the 2010-11 projected luxury tax threshold).
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The reductions in the salary cap and luxury tax threshold projec-
tions are due to an anticipated drop in BRI for the 2009-10 season,
which will be used to calculate both the salary cap and luxury tax
threshold for the 2010-11 season.57 The problem with such reductions
is that many teams have signed several of their players to long-term,
guaranteed contracts-up to five or six years, depending on the type
of contract-that contain raises as high as eight to ten percent per
year.58 Many teams agreed to these contracts during better economic
times, when projections indicated healthy future increases in the BRI
and, accordingly, the salary cap and luxury tax threshold. 59 This situa-
tion creates two issues for teams. First, as the salary cap declines,
teams become less able to sign new players as they lose room under
the salary cap as their payroll increases. More importantly, from an
economic standpoint, the decrease in the luxury tax threshold will lead
to many teams being locked into guaranteed contracts that substan-
tially raise their payroll every year. However, the current decline in
BRI reduces the luxury tax and thus costs owners millions of dollars in
the dollar-for-dollar penalty on the excess payroll above the luxury
tax threshold. This fundamental flaw in the NBA's current economic
structure helps provide some context for the likely subjects of the re-
negotiation of the NBA's CBA.
B. Temporary Solutions to Revenue Problems
The renegotiation of the NBA's CBA is still a year away and any
relief for team owners would come, at the earliest, during the 2011-12
season. In the meantime, teams continue to struggle with the eco-
nomic realities and challenges of the Great Recession. 60 Unsurpris-
ingly, the NBA and its teams have been taking temporary measures to
help address the aforementioned revenue and financial issues. For ex-
ample, toward the end of the 2008-09 season, the league secured a
$200 million line of credit to allow fifteen teams to borrow money to
57. See Larry Coon's NBA Salary FAQ, supra note 43.
58. See Fran Blinebury, Summer Market May Be More Wind Than Windfall, NBA.com, Feb.
25, 2009, http://www.nba.com/2009/news/features/fran-blinebury/02/24/fran.20090224/ (noting
that mid-level exceptions contracts-which can run for up to five years-contain eight percent
raises per year, while maximum contract extensions contain ten percent raises per year).
59. Id.
60. It is worth noting that one positive factor that enables NBA teams to avoid complete
financial disaster during this difficult economic period is deriving a share of the league's eight-
year, $7.4 billion broadcast rights contract that does not expire until 2015. See Berger, supra
note _. Without this healthy revenue stream, the NBA and its teams would be dealing with far
greater economic challenges than those they currently face.
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help them during these difficult economic times.61 The NBA allowed
teams to use the money for whatever purposes they wanted, and many
expected teams to use it to help cover operating losses for the year.62
Twelve teams accepted the offer and were able to secure amounts
ranging from $13 million to $20 million per team.63
The league and its teams have also used layoffs to offset the declin-
ing revenue streams they face. In fact, the NBA was the first major
professional sports league64 to announce that it would lay off a signifi-
cant portion of its workforce. 65 Some teams, like the Charlotte Bob-
cats, also laid off employees. 66 Other teams, like the Boston Celtics,
chose to leave vacant front office positions unfilled to avoid making
layoffs in the future. 67 In addition, many teams reduced the number
of assistant coaches, scouts, and even the number of players on their
roster to cut costs. 6 8 Finally, some teams imposed across-the-board
budget cuts to their operating budgets to address the drop in
revenue.69
To combat drops in attendance, many teams have reduced or frozen
ticket prices or offered special ticket packages to maintain and attract
sizable crowds. For the 2009-10 season, nineteen teams froze their
season ticket prices, seven decreased their season ticket prices, and
only three teams increased their season ticket prices.70 In fact, for the
61. Daniel Kaplan & John Lombardo, NBA Securing $175M for Clubs, SPORTSBUSINESS-
JOURNAL.COM, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/61537 (detailing the
original announcement of $175 million); Tim Lemke, NBA Gets a Loan, WASHINGTON-
TIMES.COM, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/26/nba-set-to-ac-
quire-175-million-line-of-credit/ (reporting on the additional $25 million secured by the league).
62. See Matt Egan, NBA Secures $200 Million Despite Credit Crisis, FOXBUSINESS.COM, Feb.
26, 2009, http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/industrieslentertainment/nba-secures-m-de-
spite-credit-crisis/.
63. See NBA Lines Up $200 Million for Teams, ESPN.com, Feb. 27, 2009, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nbalnews/story?id=3936991.
64. It is generally accepted that the four major American professional sports leagues are the
NBA, NFL, NHL, and MLB.
65. See League to Lay Off About 80 Amid Economic Slowdown, Stern Says, ESPN.com, Oct.
13, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3640507.
66. Steve Aschburner, NBA Taking Preventative Measures During Slow Economic Times,
Sl.com, Oct. 8, 2008, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/steve-aschburner/10/07/nba.
economy/index.html (noting that the Bobcats laid off thirty-five members of their front office
staff).
67. Id.
68. See Geoffrey A. Arnold, NBA Teams Cut Rosters, Assistants, Scouts to Reduce Costs, THE
OREGONIAN, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/nbalindex.ssf/2009/10/nba-teamsshrink_
rosters assis.htmi.
69. See Lombard & Mickle, supra note 19. The New Jersey Nets, for example, offered their
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2010-11 season, the Detroit Pistons, Golden State Warriors, Miami
Heat, Minnesota Timberwolves, and Sacramento Kings have already
announced that they will reduce season ticket prices, while other
teams-including the Oklahoma City Thunder and Phoenix Suns-
have frozen ticket prices for the upcoming season.7 1  In addition,
many teams have stopped requiring one lump sum payment for season
tickets, moving instead to payment plans that can stretch for up to
twelve months-to help fans better afford tickets by paying for them
over time.72 Finally, many teams have also put together competitive
ticket packages to draw in fans. For example, for the 2008-09 season,
the Chicago Bulls had a buy-one-get-one-free promotion; the Mem-
phis Grizzlies sold "Family Fun Packs" that included four tickets, four
Pepsis, and four hot dogs for forty-eight dollars; the Indiana Pacers
offered a promotion where fans could buy eleven games for the price
of eight; and the New Jersey Nets sold 1,300 tickets for a package
price of $440, equaling $10 per game.73 In these regards, many teams
have been forced to implement creative approaches to their ticket
sales to meet their attendance and revenue goals during these chal-
lenging economic times.
71. See Amid Losing Season, Pistons Cut Prices for 2010-11, SI.com, April 12, 2010, http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/basketball/nba/wires/04/12/2030.ap.bkn.pistons.tickets.0094/ (De-
troit Pistons); Marcus Thompson, II, Golden State Warriors Offer Season Ticket-Holders Price
Reductions for Next Season, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Mar. 16, 2010, available at http://www.inside
bayarea.com/ci_14689109?source=mostemailed (Golden State Warriors); Sarah Talalay, Miami
Heat Freezing Season Ticket Prices, Holding Scavenger Hunt for Prizes, SUNSENTINEL.COM, Feb.
23, 2010, http://blogs.trb.com/sports/custom/business/blog/2010/02/miami heat-freezing-season
tic.html (Miami Heat); Wolves to Cut '10-11 Season Ticket Costs in March, SPORTs.YAHOO.COM,
Feb. 22, 2010, http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=ap-timberwolves-tickets (Minnesota
Timberwolves); Darnell Mayberry, Thunder Will Not Increase Season Ticket Prices,
OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 2, 2010, available at http://newsok.com/thunder-will-not-increase-season-
ticket-prices/article/3443176 (Oklahoma City Thunder); Suns Won't Raise Season-Ticket Prices
for 2010-11, SPORTINGNEws.coM, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/article/2010-
02-10/suns-wont-raise-season-ticket-prices-for-2010-11 (Phoenix Suns); and Sam Amick, Kings
Cut 2010-11 Season Ticket Prices, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 17, 2010, at IC, http://www.sacbee.
com/2010/02/17/2542284/kings-cut-2010-11-season-ticket.html (Sacramento Kings). Other teams,
including the Atlanta Hawks, Milwaukee Bucks, and Portland Trailblazers have all increased
season ticket prices for the 2010-11 season. See Michael Cunningham, Some Hawks Season-
Ticket Holders Hit With Big Price Hike, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Mar. 20,2010, avail-
able at http://www.ajc.com/sports/atlanta-hawks/some-hawks-season-ticket-387708.html (Atlanta
Hawks); Don Walker, Bucks Raise Season-Ticket Prices, JSONLINE.COM, Mar. 4, 2010, http://
www.jsonline.com/sports/bucks/86453212.html (Milwaukee Bucks); and Joe Freeman, Trail Blaz-
ers Fans Renew Season Tickets at High Rate Despite Increased Prices, OREGONIAN, Mar. 16,2010,
available at http://blog.oregonlive.com/behindblazersbeat/2010/03/trail_blazersfans-renew-
seaso.html (Portland Trailblazers).
72. See Lombardo & Mickle, supra note 19.
73. See Simmons, supra note 47 (noting the Chicago Bulls' and Memphis Grizzlies' promo-
tions) and Aschburner, supra note 66 (detailing the Indiana Pacers' and New Jersey Nets'
promotions).
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Overall, the NBA has experienced severe economic challenges that
it has not faced in decades, if ever. The drop in BRI and the losses
sustained have led the league and its teams to adjust the ways in which
they do business-cutting expenses and crafting creative ticket pack-
ages to draw a sufficient attendance. However, the effects of the
Great Recession on the NBA can perhaps be most distinctly observed
in how the current economic circumstances have impacted the players.
III. THE EFFECTS ON THE PLAYERS
The reduction in the BRI and the attendant decrease in the salary
cap and luxury tax threshold have forced NBA teams to reconsider
their approaches to filling their player rosters. Such adjustments have
impacted players in the areas of free agent signings, shrinking rosters,
and buy-outs of player contracts. Interestingly, these changes have
also seemed to benefit the more economically successful teams at the
expense of the teams struggling in the current economic downturn.
As discussed above, the decrease in the salary cap reduced the num-
ber of teams with room under the salary cap to sign free agents during
the free agent signing period before the 2009-10 season. This was due,
in part, to teams agreeing to guaranteed contracts with players that
were signed years before the Great Recession began when the NBA
anticipated revenues-and thus the salary cap-to rise each year.74
Moreover, many of the teams that had salary cap space this past off-
season-such as the Memphis Grizzlies and Minnesota
Timberwolves-were teams that could not afford to increase their
payroll because of their existing losses.75 Consequently, there were
not as many teams looking to sign free agents, and those that were
faced the restrictions of the salary cap that limited the amount they
were able to pay the players.
Teams with expensive, long-term player contracts-those that
caused salary cap inflexibility for many teams-were unable to trade
these contracts to create salary cap space for free agent signings for
two reasons. First, the CBA limits the difference in salaries between
two trading teams to 125% plus $100,000.76 In this regard, teams mak-
74. See Blinbury, supra note 58.
75. See Eric Pincus, Rumors: A Fresh Look at the 2009 Cap Teams, HOOPSWORLD.COM, Feb.
27, 2009, http://www.hoopsworld.com/Story.aspstory-id=l 1764.
76. See Larry Coon's NBA Salary FAQ, supra note 43. If two teams involve another team or
two in the trade, one or more teams may be able to create more significant salary cap space
because the differential in contracts being traded can be spread out more unevenly among the
teams involved in the trade. Id. However, multi-team trades are naturally more complicated to
accomplish. Moreover, as discussed further above, most teams were looking to shed payroll,
thus limiting potential trade partners willing to agree to such trades.
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ing such trades can only create a limited amount of salary cap space
through such trades. Second, with the reduction in the salary cap and
luxury tax threshold, most teams sought to shed payroll to remain
under the salary cap or, at the very least, to avoid paying the luxury
tax.7 7 This like-mindedness among teams led to few offseason trades
that enabled teams to free up salary cap space for free agent signings.
Rather, teams' focus on avoiding the luxury tax led to a depressed
free agent market for the summer of 2009 where marquee players had
to take significant pay cuts and sign contracts for far less money than
they would have before the Great Recession.78 For example, after
making more than $10 million a year for the past several years, Mike
Bibby signed a three-year, $18 million contract with the Atlanta
Hawks.79 Jason Kidd signed a three-year, $25 million contract with
the Dallas Mavericks after making $21.4 million that past season.80
Rasheed Wallace took a pay cut of more than fifty percent in signing a
two-year contract with the Boston Celtics.8 I Ron Artest and Trevor
Ariza, players who had very successful 2008-09 seasons, would have
normally been in high demand and commanded fairly lucrative multi-
year contracts. 82 Instead, both players accepted five-year contracts at
the mid-level exception starting at $5.854 million-contracts that
many deemed to be far below their normal market value.83
One reason for this change in free agent contracts was the salary
cap limitations imposed by the CBA. For example, if a team was over
the salary cap-and most teams who were looking to add free agent
players were-there were only two main possibilities for those teams
to sign players under the CBA: the mid-level exception or the vet-
eran's minimum exception.84 The mid-level exception allows a team
over the salary cap to sign a player for an amount equal to the average
NBA salary. 5 The veteran's minimum exception allows a team over
the salary cap to sign a veteran player to a contract for a set modest
salary-usually around $1 million-that is determined by the number
77. See Shaun Powell, In Changing Economy, Expiring Contracts a Golden Ticket, NBA.com,
Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.nba.com/2009/news/features/shaun-powell/12/29/contracts/index.html.
78. See Howard Beck, Midlevel Exception Becoming a Norm, NYTIMES.COM, July 7, 2009,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9900EODBl431F934A35754COA96F9C8B63.
79. See Berger, supra note 9.
80. See Beck, supra note 78.
81. Id.
82. See Berger, supra note 9.
83. See Beck, supra note 78.
84. See Perzik, supra note 45.
85. See id.
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of years the players has been in the league.86 In this regard, because
the few teams seeking to sign free agents were already over the salary
cap, the NBA CBA limited the amount of money they could offer to
those players. The other reason for this shift in the free agent market
was that teams facing growing losses from the economic downtown
were simply unwilling to pay marquee player salaries as they were
already facing significant revenue losses.
This reluctance to increase payroll also affected many average play-
ers' ability to obtain a guaranteed, multi-year contract.87 Before the
Great Recession, players that averaged five points per game or more
were all but ensured a guaranteed contract and oftentimes a multi-
year contract.88 However, the Great Recession created a far more
challenging market for such players. For example, NBA veterans
Rashard McCants and Desmond Mason settled for non-guaranteed,
one-year contracts for the 2009-10 season with the Houston Rockets
and Sacramento Kings, respectively.89 Joey Graham, a player who av-
eraged a career-best 7.7 points per game during the 2008-09 season,
commented that the reason he only received a non-guaranteed, one-
year contract for the 2009-10 season was "because of the recession and
because a lot of teams are bankrupt."90 Finally, many believe that
free agents during the summer of 2010 will face teams wanting to offer
one-year contracts that would expire in 2011 when the NBA CBA ter-
minates and a potential lockout by the owners might take place. 91 In
all of these regards, the Great Recession caused a rather dramatic
shift in the NBA free agent market, affecting both marquee and aver-
age players who are settling for cheaper, shorter, and sometimes non-
guaranteed, contracts.
NBA players also faced a more competitive free agent market be-
cause teams decided to carry fewer players on their rosters than in
past years. The CBA requires teams to carry a minimum of thirteen
players and a maximum of fifteen players. 92 In the past, teams tended
86. See Larry Coon's NBA Salary FAQ, supra note 43. See also Minimum Annual Salary
Scale, NBA.com, Aug. 4, 2005, at http://www.nba.com/news/cbaminimumsalary_050804.html.
87. See Chris Tomasson, Teams Might Remain Stingy in Handing Out Guaranteed Contracts,





91. Brian Karpuk, Will There Be An NBA Lockout in 2011?, NEwsBURGALAR.COM, June 3,
2009, http://newsburglar.com/2009/06/03/nba-lockout-201 1/.
92. See Larry Coon's NBA Salary FAQ, supra note 43.
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to carry a roster with the maximum fifteen players.93 However, in an
attempt to cut costs during the difficult economic times, many teams
started the 2009-10 season with fewer than this maximum player ros-
ter.9 4 In fact, at the beginning of the 2009-10 season, three teams had
thirteen players on their roster; seven teams had fourteen players; and
the remaining twenty teams had the maximum fifteen players.95 While
smaller rosters provide teams with less flexibility and more vulnerabil-
ity to player injuries, the economic circumstances necessitated such
reductions in team rosters-thus providing fewer jobs for players in
the league.
Finally, the recent economic downturn has also given rise to teams'
almost maniacal interest in expiring contracts, particularly those that
teams can buy out for less than the remaining amount owed. In order
to free up salary cap space or to bring their payroll below the luxury
tax threshold-whether for the current season or the following one-
many teams actively sought trades where they would trade players
with longer-term contracts in exchange for players with expiring con-
tracts. 96 Such trade scenarios oftentimes led to seemingly imbalanced
trades from a player talent perspective. For example, the New Jersey
Nets traded all-star guard Vince Carter to the Eastern Conference
Champion Orlando Magic for the expiring contracts of Tony Battie
and Rafer Alston, as well as for Courtney Lee, who was scheduled to
make only $1.3 million for the 2009-10 season. 97 The Nets agreed to
this trade largely for financial reasons-to reduce their payroll for the
2010-11 season when Battie's and Alston's contracts expired-while
the Magic sought to use the trade to add a premier player that would
help them improve in their quest for an NBA championship.
Similarly, before the 2009-10 season, the Milwaukee Bucks traded
Richard Jefferson-one of their best, though higher-priced players-
to the San Antonio Spurs for Kurt Thomas and Bruce Bowen.98 From
a talent standpoint, the Spurs clearly got the better part of the trade.
However, the Bucks-facing significant financial difficulties-got two
expiring contracts with Thomas and Bowen that proved valuable be-




96. See Berger, supra note 9.
97. Id. The Orlando Magic also received Ryan Anderson in the trade.
98. See Chad Ford, Bucks Deal Jefferson to Spurs, ESPN.com, June 24. 2009, http://sports.
espn.go.comlnba/news/story?id=4281291. The Spurs also sent Fabricio Oberto to the Detroit
Pistons, who sent Amir Johnson to the Bucks as well. Id.
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cause they would provide payroll relief for the 2010-11 season. 99
Moreover, Bowen's contract was only partially guaranteed-for $2
million of the $6.35 million owed on the contract-and thus the Bucks
also received immediate payroll relief by releasing Bowen.'"
Teams also have a keen interest in contracts that they can buy out
because it can provide them with luxury tax relief. If a team can buy
out a player's contract for less than the amount owed on it, the team's
payroll is thus reduced. For teams that are slightly above the luxury
tax threshold, such a reduction from a contract buyout can lower their
payroll to the point where they avoid paying the dollar-for-dollar lux-
ury tax. 01 For many players who are traded, the option of a contract
buyout can be attractive as they can then sign with another team that
may provide opportunities for more playing time, a long-term con-
tract, and/or the possibility of playing for a championship. In these
regards, the NBA trading market has become dominated by expiring
contracts and contract buyouts as teams in financial trouble seek play-
ers with expiring contracts to enable them to reduce their payroll and
possibly provide salary cap flexibility or even avoid luxury tax
payments.
These changes in the market for NBA player services has not only
negatively impacted players' salaries and opportunities, they have also
potentially exacerbated an existing divide within the NBA between
the "haves" and the "have-nots." The teams that are experiencing
success on the basketball court are also the teams that are doing the
best financially. 102 These teams include the Boston Celtics, Cleveland
Cavaliers, Dallas Mavericks, and the Los Angeles Lakers. 03 In this
changed NBA player market, these teams-the "haves"-can take ad-
vantage of many of the other teams that are looking to save money.
As discussed above, teams in financial straits-the "have-nots"-will
trade a marquee player that is signed for a longer-term, guaranteed
contract for players with expiring contracts (particularly those that can
be bought out). The haves are in a financial position to take on the
longer-term contract with guaranteed money because they are in
99. See Berger, supra note 9.
100. See Ford, supra note 98.
101. See Marty Burns, All the Rage: Webber Just the Latest Player to Get Contract Buyout,
SI.com, Jan. 12, 2007, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/marty-burns/01/12/con-
tract.buyouts/index.html.
102. See Bill Simmons, How to Change Your NBA Destiny, ESPN.com, Dec. 23, 2009, http://
sports.espn.go.comlespn/page2/story?page=simmons/091223&sportCat=nba. To be sure, there
are teams like the Orlando Magic that have experienced great success on the court but that
continue to face financial challenges. However, as a general matter, the proposition that the
successful teams are also the most financial stable teams seems to hold true.
103. See id.
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healthier financial shape and are likely seeking to improve their
chances of winning a championship. Due to their financial challenges,
the have-nots must trade superior talent for inferior talent to gain pay-
roll relief-and possibly luxury tax relief-for either that season or
the next season. Moreover, because of the depressed free agent mar-
ket, teams like the Los Angeles Lakers can afford to not only use their
mid-level exception to sign a player despite being over the salary cap
and luxury tax threshold, but they can sign an elite player like Ron
Artest because of the lack of demand for his services by financially
struggling teams. Consequently, the better and more financially
sound teams in the league create a greater gap between their talent
level and that of the have-nots, who must make trade and free agent
decisions based largely on economic concerns rather than on competi-
tive ones.
All of these changes brought about by the Great Recession-from
the decline in revenue-have had a significant effect on the NBA, its
teams, and its players. These problems with the NBA's current finan-
cial structure-whether created or unearthed by the economic down-
turn-will spur proposed reforms sought by both sides when labor
and management renegotiate the CBA before the 2011-12 season.
IV. THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE CBA
The renegotiation of the NBA CBA looms large, and there is al-
ready talk about a possible lockout by the owners. To properly con-
textualize the likely controversial CBA terms that will be heavily
negotiated, it is important to analyze their relevance to the collective
bargaining process and to situate the significance of the collective bar-
gaining process in sports, labor, and employment law.
A. The Collective Bargaining Process
The CBA is the "'supreme governing authority' concerning employ-
ment" in professional sports leagues that is created through the collec-
tive bargaining process.104 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
provides for the collective bargaining process, where a professional
sports league's owners and players' union can negotiate the rules and
regulations of the relationship between the two sides. 05 In American
League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Ass'n of National Baseball League
104. Michael A. Mahone, Jr., Sentencing Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Anal-
ysis of the National Football League's Revised Personal Conduct Policy, II VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 181, 192 (2008).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (originally enacted in 1935); see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) ("to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
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Umpires,106 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) established
its jurisdiction over professional sports leagues in holding that Con-
gress had intended for the NLRB to apply to Major League Base-
ball.107 Through this holding, the NLRB applied the NLRA to
professional sports. The NLRA thus allowed players to unionize and
the players' union to negotiate with the league regarding the terms of
employment and other related subjects for their members through the
collective bargaining process. 08
For a CBA to be valid, both the players' union and the league must
ensure that certain requirements of the collective bargaining process
are met. The collective bargaining negotiations must include certain
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, including hours, wages,
and working conditions.109 If either side refuses to negotiate on a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, such a refusal constitutes a
violation of the duty to collectively bargain and results in an unfair
labor practice. 0 Both sides must also negotiate in good faith.' Fi-
of the employees to ... confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment").
106. Am. League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Ass'n of Nat'l Baseball League Umpires, 180
NLRB 190 (1969).
107. See id. at 191. Before this case, there had been a string of cases that held that Major
League Baseball (MLB) did not engage in interstate commerce. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balti-
more, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. N.Y.
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). The NLRB navigated
around this precedent, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that MLB was en-
gaged in interstate commerce, but refused to overturn these cases based on stare decisis. See
Joshua M. Kimura, The Return of the Natural: How the Federal Government Can Ensure that Roy
Hobbs Outlasts Barry Bonds in Major League Baseball, 16 SPORTs LAw. J. 111, 135 (2009).
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court had also held that all other professional sports leagues were
engaged in interstate commerce. See Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52
(1957).
108. Melanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary
Cap Systems, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 191-92 (2003). Like other employee unions, a players'
unions can seek certification when (1) the union can show that it has a substantial allegiance
among the players; (2) the union petitions the NLRB to hold a secret ballot election; and (3) if
the union garners a majority of the players' votes, the NLRB certifies the union as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all of the players. See Laura J. Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: Neutralityl
Card Check Agreements and the Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 1589, 1589 (2008). As the
exclusive representative of the players, the union has a duty of fair representation that ensures
the union represents all of its members "fairly, impartially, and in good faith." See Jan Stiglitz,
Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARo. SPORTs L.J. 167, 173 (1995) (citing Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944)).
109. Michael J. Redding & Daniel R. Peterson, Third and Long: The Issues Facing the NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effects of an Uncapped Year, 20 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 95, 98 (2009).
110. See Brian D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern's Excessive Use of Rule-Making Au-
thority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 205, 218 (2007).
111. Walter T. Champion, Jr., "Mixed Metaphors," Revisionist History and Post-Hypnotic Sug-
gestions on the Interpretation of Sports Antitrust Exemptions: The Second Circuit's Use in Clarett
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nally, both sides must engage in bona fide, arms-length bargaining."12
If these requirements are met and the players' union and the league
reach agreement, the result of the negotiation process will be a final-
ized CBA.113
The CBA proves significant for many reasons. For example, the
CBA, including its terms and conditions of employment for the play-
ers, enjoy special protection from antitrust laws. As one scholar has
noted, "[t]here is an inherent conflict between labor laws and antitrust
laws."ll 4 On the one hand, labor law seeks to further collective bar-
gaining to reach agreement between unions and multi-employer bar-
gaining units." 5 Underlying labor laws is the belief that without
unionization and the collective bargaining process, workers will not be
able to achieve fair market value for their services.1 6 To this end,
labor laws "were enacted to enable collective action by union mem-
bers to achieve wage levels that are higher than would be available on
the free market.""'7 On the other hand, underlying antitrust laws is
the belief that collusion among competing businesses hurts consumers
as these businesses manipulate pricing and market conditions." 8 Ac-
cordingly, antitrust laws prohibit restraint on trade or commerce, in-
cluding in labor markets."19
A tension between these two areas of law arises-as it does in the
professional sports context-because multi-employer bargaining can
involve all of the employers or potential employers for a specific
of a Piazza-like "Innovative Reinterpretation of Supreme Court Dogma", 20 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 55, 67 (2009).
112. See Jeffrey Hoffmeyer, Fourth Down and an Appeal: The Nonstatutory Exemption to
Antitrust Law in Clarett v. National Football League, 13 SPoRrs LAw. J. 193, 199 (2006).
113. See George T. Stieful, III, Comment, Hard Ball, Soft Law in MLB: Who Died and Made
WADA the Boss?, 56 BuFF. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2008).
114. Sean W.L. Alford, Dusting Off the AK-47: An Examination ofNFL Players' Most Power-
ful Weapon in an Antitrust Lawsuit Against the NFL, 88 N.C.L. REV. 212, 223 (2009).
115. See id.
116. See Michael C. Harper, Multiemployer Bargaining, Antitrust Laws, and Team Sports: The
Contingent Choice of a Broad Exemption, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1663, 1692 (1997).
117. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 253 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and "Free Movements" Risks of Expanding U.S.
Professional Sports Leagues Into Europe, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 403, 413-15 (2009) (describ-
ing antitrust laws related to labor restraints).
119. See Harper, supra note 116, at 1692; see also Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890)
("[elvery contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is de-
clared to be illegal"). Antitrust laws apply to all professional sports leagues, with the exception
of MLB. See John C. Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 703, 705 (1977); see also Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. at 200
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group of workers. 120 In this regard, this situation restrains these work-
ers' ability to negotiate for employment in the free market.121 To ad-
dress this conflict, courts and legislatures have developed both
statutory and nonstatutory exemptions that make the collective bar-
gaining process and the resultant CBA immune from antitrust laws. 122
The most relevant exemption for professional sports leagues is the
nonstatutory exemption. For the nonstatutory exemption to apply,
the circumstances must meet a three-prong test. First, the restraint
that would otherwise violate antitrust laws must "primarily affect[ ]
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship." 2 3 Next, the
restraint must involve a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 124
Lastly, the collective bargaining must have been accomplished
through arms-length bargaining. 125 If the restraint at issue meets all
three parts of the test, it is exempt from antitrust laws. If properly
negotiated, the CBA is immune from antitrust laws and it thus serves
as the definitive governing document regarding the terms and condi-
tions of players' employment. In this regard, the league cannot unilat-
erally change these terms and conditions without engaging in the
collective bargaining process. 126 To that same end, players cannot
change the terms and conditions of their employment-including rules
governing contracts and the like-without engaging in collective bar-
gaining. This context helps explain the importance of the upcoming
NBA CBA renegotiation and why the stakes are so high regarding the
proposed changes that each side seeks.
B. Likely Issues in the CBA Renegotiation
In light of the economic woes facing many NBA teams, many pre-
dict that the owners will lock out the players as soon as the current
CBA expires after the 2010-11 season unless the NBPA agrees to ma-
jor concessions.127 Based on the economic'problems detailed above,
NBA Commissioner David Stern and team owners want to reduce the
amount of revenue devoted to players' salaries, cut back player sala-
120. See Alford, supra note 114, at 223.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 223-24.
123. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (1976).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Stiglitz, supra note 108, at 173.
127. See Chris Tomasson, Veteran Players Believe NBA Lockout More Likely Than Not,
FANHOUSE.COM, Feb. 10, 2010, http://nba.fanhouse.com/2010/02/I/veteran-players-believe-nba-
lockout-more-likely-than-not/.
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ries, and shorten the length of players' contracts.128 The league's first
proposal to the NBPA addressed these concerns. In the proposal, the
league proposed reducing the amount of revenue dedicated to players'
salaries-currently at fifty-seven percent of BRI-to forty percent of
BRI.129 The proposed change would reduce the amount of money
teams would have to spend on players' salaries by approximately $4.6
million per year.o30 With the significant losses sustained by teams re-
cently, this proposed reform seeks to not only lower costs for teams,
but to provide more funds to the teams through this reallocation of
revenue from player salaries to other expenses.
The league also proposed reducing the maximum salary guarantees
for veterans and rookies by nearly a third of what players are eligible
for under the current CBA.i'3 Under the current CBA, the length of
the maximum veteran contract is six years if a team is re-signing its
own player and five years if it is signing a free agent.132 The starting
salary under such a contract equals the maximum allowable under the
NBA salary cap: twenty-five percent of the existing salary cap for
players with less than seven years experience and thirty percent of the
existing salary cap for players with seven or more years of experi-
ence.1 33 The player then enjoys 10.5% pay increases for each of the
subsequent five years on the contract. 34 In recent years, some maxi-
mum veteran contracts have totaled more than $100 million.'35 Under
the league's proposal, the maximum veteran contract would be worth
less than $60 million-significantly less than what players currently
128. See Mitch Lawrence, NBA Seeks New Pact, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 14, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 6958809.
129. See Frank Hughes, Players, Owners Already at Odds, SI.com, Feb. 13, 2010, http://sports
illustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/frank hughes/02/12/labor.talks/index.html?eref=sihp. Under
the current NBA CBA, the teams get forty-three percent of BRI; in the league's proposal, teams
would receive sixty percent of BRI. Id. Some believe that the allocation of the BRI may wind
up falling somewhere in between-perhaps a fifty-fifty split of BRI between the teams and play-
ers' salaries. See Steve Kyler, The Things to Know About the Next CBA, HooPSWORLD.COM,
Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.hoopsworld.com/Story.asp?story-id=15114.
130. See Kyler, supra note 129.
131. See Union: NBA Tears Up Proposal After Meeting, NBCSPORTS.Com, Feb. 12, 2010, http:/
/nbcsports.msnbc.comlid/35374515/ns/sports-nba/.
132. See NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 42, at art. XI, § 4.
133. See Jonathan B. Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the Reserve Sys-
ten to Free Agency, 15 SPORTS LAW J. 21, 50 (2008). See also NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT, supra note 42, at art. II, § (7)(a)(2).
134. See Goldberg, supra note 133, at 50.
135. See, e.g., Report: Arenas Agrees to Six-Year, $111 Million Contract to Help Wizards' Fu-
ture. ESPN.com, July 7, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3473164 (noting that
Gilbert Arenas' six-year, $111 million contract was approximately $16 million less than the al-
lowable contract that the Washington Wizards could offer him).
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enjoy.136 This proposed reduction is due to a decrease in both the
yearly salary of the contract and in the length of the contract. The
league's proposal contemplates a maximum of four years for a veteran
player re-signing with their existing team and a maximum of three
years for players signing with a different team. 37 This is in stark con-
trast to the existing six-year and five-year maximum lengths of veter-
ans' contracts. In these regards, players face significant reductions in
the length and pay of their maximum veteran contracts. Moreover,
under the league's proposal, only half of a player's contract would be
guaranteed-also a major shift from the fully guaranteed contracts the
players currently enjoy.' 3 8
The salary cap also appears to be of great concern to the league. In
their proposal, the league suggested implementing a "hard" salary
cap-where a team's total player salary cannot exceed the salary cap
for any reason. 139 This proposed hard salary cap would eliminate the
"Larry Bird" exception-which allows teams to exceed the salary cap
to resign its own players-and other exceptions, such as the mid-level
exception, that currently allow teams to sign players to contracts
above the soft salary cap threshold.140 From the teams' perspective, a
hard salary cap ensures a ceiling for payroll costs-thus minimizing
the chances for the type of financial difficulties that many teams are
currently facing. Finally, the league seeks to retroactively modify ex-
isting long-term contracts to comport with its proposed structure.141
While unlikely to occur, this aspect of the proposal would ensure a
smooth transition if indeed the NBA adopts a hard salary cap.142
136. See Report: NBA Proposal Targets Players' Salary Cuts, NBA.com, Feb. 11, 2010, http://
www.nba.com/2010/news/02/11/CBA.proposal.ap/index.html (noting that the less than $60 mil-
lion figure would be less than half of what Cleveland Cavaliers forward LeBron James could
earn if he opts out of his contract and resigns with the Cavaliers for the maximum veteran con-
tract during the summer of 2010).
137. See Hughes, supra note 129.
138. See Chris Sheridan, Foyle Says Owner Proposal Goes Too Far, ESPN.com, Feb. 7, 2010,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=4895310.
139. See Hughes, supra note 129 (detailing the league's proposal). See also Benjamin A. Tulis,
Final-Offer "Baseball" Arbitration: Contexts, Mechanics & Applications, SETON HALL J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 85, 94 n.33 (2010) (defining a "hard" salary cap).
140. See Hughes, supra note 129. See also Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Money: The
Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes. 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 1459, 1488 n.157 (2006) (detailing the Larry Bird exception).
141. See Hughes, supra note 129.
142. See Sheridan, supra note 138 (detailing transition issues from a soft salary cap to a hard
salary cap). The NBPA is unlikely to approve the retroactivity facet of the proposal because it
has already signaled that it will not seriously renegotiate the NBA CBA until after the summer
of 2010 when many of the league's star players are poised to sign lucrative new contracts as free
agents. See Hughes, supra note 129.
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The NBPA has called the league's proposal "oppressive" 4 3 and
"rash" and "unfair."l 4 4 The players' union has also made it clear to
the league that it would not accept a hard salary cap as a starting point
for negotiations.14 5 In this regard, the NBPA has made it clear to the
league that it will negotiate vigorously on these monetary and contrac-
tual issues. Moreover, the players' union may seek a change of its
own: the way that NBA teams share revenue. Many players believe-
perhaps unsurprisingly-that the root of the NBA's financial
problems stems not from the length and amount of players' contracts,
but rather from the perceived inequitable manner in which revenue is
shared between larger market and smaller market teams.14 6 Conse-
quently, the NBPA may push for reforms in revenue sharing between
the teams to close the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots"-
a gap that has been seemingly exacerbated, as discussed above, by the
current economic downturn.14 7 Indeed, the players' union may not be
willing to concede any portion of their existing share of BRI unless
the owners agree to amend their current revenue sharing arrange-
ment.14 8 Given that the NBPA and the league seem so far apart on
these critical subjects of negotiation for the CBA, it is hard to predict
on which issues each side may be willing to compromise.
V. CONCLUSION
The upcoming renegotiation of the CBA may well find some terms
upon which the NBPA and the league can reach agreement more eas-
ily. For example, both sides have demonstrated a willingness to dis-
cuss a possible reduction in the regular season schedule-currently
eighty-two games long-to help prevent injuries to players and to
keep fans engaged and interested throughout the regular season.14 9 In
addition, there may be a number of non-monetary matters on which
the two sides will negotiate. For example, NBA Commissioner David
Stern has long sought to raise the minimum age requirement for the
league from its current age of nineteen to twenty years. 5 0 The league
143. See Union: NBA Tears Up Proposal After Meeting, supra note 131 (quoting NBPA Exec-
utive Director Billy Hunter as saying the NBPA was seeking "an agreement that's a lot more
equitable and that doesn't have a structure that's oppressive).
144. See Sheridan, supra note 138 (quoting NBPA Vice President Adonal Foyle).
145. See id.
146. See Kyler, supra note 129.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Berger, supra note 9.
150. See Jordan Michael Rossen, The NBA's Age Minimum and Its Effect on High School
Phenoms, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 174-76 (2008) (detailing the NBA's concerns with high
school players going straight to the NBA at the age of seventeen or eighteen).
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may choose to revisit this issue during the upcoming renegotiation.' 5 '
The NBPA, which has opposed increasing the minimum age, may be
more open to this issue as a bargaining chip for other more pressing
matters-such as monetary or contractual gains-or because raising
the age requirement would allow more veterans opportunities to sign
contracts as it would further delay competition from younger
players.15 2
However, the likelihood is that the renegotiation will be conten-
tious as both sides seem strident in their economic positions. Perhaps
the recent salary cap and luxury tax threshold projections for the
2010-11 season-constituting a smaller drop in revenue than the
league anticipated-may provide both sides with some room for com-
promise on their polar economic positions. Yet the owners seem con-
tent with-perhaps even eager for-a lockout of the players for the
2010-11 season. This may be attributed, in part, to the fact that the
NBA's television contracts with ABC and Turner Sports will pay $900
million for the season-approximately $30 million per team-regard-
less of whether the NBA plays any games or not.' 53 With no player
payroll, many owners-if not all-may make money on the television
revenues alone.154 The owners may also feel resolute in locking out
the players because of the significant losses the league and many indi-
vidual teams have experienced in recent years. At the same time,
team owners must be mindful of the potential long-term negative im-
pact that a sustained lockout could inflict on the league. 55 With the
team owners' focus on reducing costs (likely through player contracts
and salaries), the NBPA may face similar circumstances as those in the
1960s and 1970s when its near entire focus in CBA negotiations was
151. However, there is a possibility that the league will not press this minimum age matter in
the renegotiation because international competition has seemingly thwarted the purpose for the
minimum age requirement-that is forcing high school students to attend college. See Matthew
Epps, Full Court Press: How Collective Bargaining Weakened the NBA's Competitive Edge in
Globalized Sport, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 345-46 (2009). Instead, the minimum age
requirement has encouraged high school students to play basketball in Europe until they are
eligible to enter the NBA. See id. This reality, coupled with the importance of the economic
gains that the league seeks, may lead Commissioner Stern and his team of negotiators to aban-
don the raising of the minimum age requirement as a subject for the upcoming renegotiation.
152. See Kyler, supra note 129.
153. See Hughes, supra note 129.
154. See id.
155. See, generally, Martin B. Schmidt & David J. Berri, The Impact of Labor Strikes on Con-
sumer Demand: An Application to Professional Sports, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 344 (2004). See also
Christopher J. McKinny, Comment, Professional Sports Leagues and the First Amendment: A
Closed Marketplace, 13 MARQ. SPoRTs L. REV. 223, 254 (2003) (noting the near devastating
effects that the work stoppage in 1994 had on MLB).
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on providing economic gains for its players.156 Yet the NBPA must
also be mindful of the economic challenges facing the league and its
owners in advocating for employment terms acceptable to their mem-
bers. Indeed, the long-term stability of the league may depend on the
ability of both sides to reach agreement and maintain labor peace.
To be sure, the economics of the NBA have changed and the pri-
mary focus of the upcoming renegotiation of the CBA will focus on
the key terms-allocation of BRI, salary cap, luxury tax, players' con-
tracts, teams' revenue sharing, etc.-in attempting to solve the finan-
cial issues plaguing the league while maintaining peace between the
NBPA and the league. How the renegotiation will be resolved re-
mains to be seen. However, one thing is clear: The Great Recession
has had a significant and potentially long-term impact on the NBA.
156. See Robert 1. Lockwood, Note, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting Scandal
Brings Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Forefront in the NBA, 15
SPORTs LAw. J. 137, 149-50 (2008).
